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Ignoring the Golden Principle of 
Charter Interpretation? 
David M. Tanovich* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One consistent and disturbing trend since the birth of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 in 1982 is that race has been and 
continues to be, with a few notable exceptions, erased from the factual 
narratives presented to the Supreme Court of Canada and from the 
constitutional legal rules established by the Court in criminal procedure 
cases. Understanding the etiology of this erasing is not easy. In earlier 
pieces, the author has explored the role of trial and appellate lawyers.2 
This paper focuses on principles of judicial review and the failure of the 
Supreme Court to consistently consider the impact on Aboriginal and 
racialized communities of the constitutional rules it creates or interprets. 
What makes the silence so problematic is that the Court gave itself the 
tool in 2001 to address part of the identified problem when it established 
an anti-racism principle of Charter interpretation in R. v. Golden.3 This 
paper seeks to address a number of questions focused on the legacy of 
Golden. What is the origin and content of the Golden principle of 
judicial review. Part II examines the evidence from subsequent cases and 
academic commentary that this is indeed an accepted principle of 
constitutional interpretation. Part III discusses the cases from the 2007 
Supreme Court term that would have benefited from a critical race 
analysis. Part IV discusses how consideration of Golden would have 
impacted the Court’s analysis in R. v. Clayton4 in particular? Finally, 
                                                                                                             
*
 Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. 
1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2
 See David M. Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining 
Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. 655; and David M. 
Tanovich, “The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38 C.R. (6th) 84. 
3
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Golden”]. I was counsel 
for Mr. Golden in the Supreme Court of Canada. 
4
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.).  
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Part V explores how the Golden principle should be applied in future 
cases. 
II. THE GOLDEN PRINCIPLE 
On January 18, 1997, Ian Golden, a suspected drug dealer, was 
subjected to multiple strip searches in a restaurant on a Saturday night in 
downtown Toronto. There were a number of individuals present in the 
restaurant during his ordeal. One of the searches took place in a narrow 
stairwell. The second took place in the back of the restaurant. After he 
was strip searched, he was restrained by numerous officers who tried to 
dislodge a small baggie from his buttocks. During this attempted seizure, 
Golden had an involuntary bowel movement. The police continued their 
search using gloves that were used in the restaurant to clean the toilets. 
Golden was subjected to a third strip search at the police station which 
was a few blocks away. The issue before the Supreme Court of Canada 
was what limits section 8 of the Charter imposed on this very intrusive 
and humiliating police power.5 Golden was African-Canadian and the 
Supreme Court had the benefit of the submissions of both the African-
Canadian Legal Clinic, which characterized Golden’s ordeal as a public 
lynching, and Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto. 
In their majority judgment, Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. recognized the 
critical race submissions of the intervenors and set out, albeit very 
briefly, what I have characterized as the Golden principle:  
… [W]e believe it is important to note the submissions of the ACLC 
and the ALST that African Canadians and Aboriginal people are 
overrepresented in the criminal justice system and are therefore likely 
to represent a disproportionate number of those who are arrested by 
police and subjected to personal searches, including strip searches 
(Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (1991), vol. 1, 
The Justice System and Aboriginal People, at p. 107; Cawsey Report, 
Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the Criminal Justice 
System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta 
(1991), vol. II, p. 7, recommendations 2.48 to 2.50; Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide (1996), at pp. 33-
39; Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice 
                                                                                                             
5
 A majority of the Court held that the police must have reasonable and probable grounds 
to conduct a strip search and that absent exigent circumstances, it must never be conducted “in the 
field”: supra, note 3, at para. 102. The majority also imposed other standards to ensure a reasonably 
conducted strip search, such as authorization from a senior officer: id., at para. 101. 
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System, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario 
Criminal Justice System (1995)). As a result, it is necessary to develop 
an appropriate framework governing strip searches in order to prevent 
unnecessary and unjustified strip searches before they occur.6 
While it would have been helpful for the Court to expand on its analysis, 
the message is clear. The Charter must be interpreted with a critical race 
or anti-racist lens to give effect to systemic racism in the criminal justice 
system including the over-policing of Aboriginal and racialized 
communities. It is an approach that ensures that police powers are 
limited or Charter standards established to shield these communities 
from the negative effects of systemic racism, such as racial profiling. 
Golden was not the first time that the Supreme Court applied 
equality principles in the interpretation and application of the Charter. In 
R. v. Mills,7 the Court applied a feminist lens in determining the 
constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions (sections 278.1 to 278.91) 
limiting an accused’s access to the therapeutic records of a sexual assault 
complainant. Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci, for the majority, held 
that:  
Equality concerns must also inform the contextual circumstances in 
which the rights of full answer and defence and privacy will come into 
play. In this respect, an appreciation of myths and stereotypes in the 
context of sexual violence is essential to delineate properly the 
boundaries of full answer and defence.8  
Moreover, a critical race approach to Charter interpretation is an 
integral part of the Supreme Court’s own approach to substantive 
                                                                                                             
6
 Id., at para. 83 (emphasis added). 
7
 [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.). 
8
 Id., at para. 90. It should be pointed out that the language of s. 278.7(2) of the Criminal 
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, demands that equality considerations be factored into the decision 
whether or not to produce the records. The Supreme Court has also applied a critical race 
perspective when interpreting statutory provisions that specifically demand an anti-discriminatory 
approach to jury selection and sentencing. See R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 
1128, at para. 47 (S.C.C.) (challenge for cause and s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code); R. v. Gladue, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) (sentencing and s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal 
Code). In the context of challenges for cause and s. 638(1)(b), McLachlin C.J.C. in Williams 
observed (at para. 48) that: 
[the right] may also be seen as an anti-discrimination right. The application, intentional 
or unintentional, of racial stereotypes to the detriment of an accused person ranks among 
the most destructive forms of discrimination. … The right must fall at the core of the 
guarantee in s. 15 of the Charter..... 
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equality under section 15(1).9 As the Chief Justice recognized in her 
extra-judicial article entitled “Racism and the Law: The Canadian 
Experience”: 
This new paradigm [of substantive equality] is directly applicable to 
racial and ethnic discrimination. It requires us to recognize the context 
of historical, racial and ethnic inequality and the myths and stereotypes 
that this context has produced. It requires us to disabuse ourselves of 
these preconceived notions, acknowledged or unacknowledged, to 
understand the reality that disadvantaged groups face, and to examine 
the claim of unequal treatment afresh on the basis of this understanding.10  
The Chief Justice further exhorted “the importance … of adapting the 
law to combat the problem of widespread racism in society” and of 
acknowledging that “courts can and should take proactive steps to 
recognize racism and prevent it from compromising … justice.11 
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOLDEN PRINCIPLE:  
DOES IT EXIST BEYOND PARAGRAPH 83? 
Following Golden, the Supreme Court applied a race-conscious lens 
again, without citing Golden, in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral 
Officer).12 The issue was whether the limitation on the right to vote for 
individuals serving penitentiary sentences was a reasonable limit on 
section 3 of the Charter. In her proportionality analysis, McLachlin 
C.J.C., for the majority, held:  
The negative effects of s. 51(e) upon prisoners have a 
disproportionate impact on Canada’s already disadvantaged Aboriginal 
population, whose overrepresentation in prisons reflects “a crisis in the 
Canadian criminal justice system”: R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 
at para. 64, per Cory and Iacobucci JJ. To the extent that the 
disproportionate number of Aboriginal people in penitentiaries reflects 
factors such as higher rates of poverty and institutionalized alienation 
                                                                                                             
9
 See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
143 (S.C.C.); Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, 
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.); and Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 
(S.C.C.). 
10
 (2002) 1 J.L. & Equality 7, at 20. 
11
 Id., at 21-22. See also the discussion in Richard Devlin & Matthew Sherrard, “The Big 
Chill?: Contextual Judgment after Hamilton and Mason” (2005) 28 Dalhousie L.J. 409. 
12
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.). 
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from mainstream society, penitentiary imprisonment may not be a fair 
or appropriate marker of the degree of individual culpability.13 
An anti-racist approach to Charter interpretation has also been 
applied post-Golden in appellate and trial courts. In R. v. Harris,14 for 
example, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized the need for factoring 
in systemic racism in the context of assessing the seriousness of, in that 
case, a section 9 violation under section 24(2) of the Charter. Justice 
Doherty, for the Court, held: 
I cannot accept the Crown’s characterization of this breach as 
“minimally intrusive”. The use of the broad powers associated with 
Highway Traffic Act stops to routinely investigate passengers who have 
nothing to do with the concerns justifying those stops must have a 
significant cumulative, long-term, negative impact on the personal 
freedom enjoyed by those who find themselves subject to this kind of 
police conduct. While for persons in some segments of the community, 
these stops may be infrequent, this record suggests that for others the 
stops are an all too familiar part of their day-to-day routine. Viewed 
from the perspective of those who are most likely to find themselves 
stopped and questioned by police, I think this form of interrogation is 
anything but trivial. It seems to me at some point it must become 
provocative.15 
What is significant about Harris is that racial profiling was not argued in 
the case and yet the Court was still preprared to factor the problem into 
the constitutional analysis. In R. v. Khawaja,16 Rutherford J. struck down 
the motive clause17 of the anti-terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code,18 
                                                                                                             
13
 Id., at para. 60. This kind of recognition of limited culpability because of systemic 
racism could be applied in cases that challenge mandatory minimum sentences, particularly for 
firearm possession cases under s. 12 of the Charter. See R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 
SCC 6 (S.C.C.), where the Court dismissed a constitutional challenge to s. 236(a) of the Criminal 
Code which sets a minimum sentence of four years for manslaughter cases involving firearms. 
14
 [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.). 
15
 Id., at para. 63. 
16
 [2006] O.J. No. 4245, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 399 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Khawaja”]. 
17
 This motive clause forms part of the definition of “terrorist activity” in the Criminal 
Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A), and provides that the impugned act must be 
committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause”.  
18
 Criminal Code, s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A) is part of Part II.I, which was enacted as part of Bill 
C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the 
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the 
registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism, S.C. 2001, c. 41 [hereinafter “Anti-terrorism 
Act”]. It came into force on December 24, 2001.  
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in part, because of a concern that it would enable racial and ethnic 
profiling.19 As he put it: 
It seems to me that the inevitable impact to flow from the inclusion of 
the “political, religious or ideological purpose” requirement in the 
definition of “terrorist activity” will be to focus investigative and 
prosecutorial scrutiny on the political, religious and ideological beliefs, 
opinions and expressions of persons and groups both in Canada and 
abroad.20 
And, most recently, in R. v. Samuels,21 Nakatsuru J. specifically 
referred to Golden in support of his conclusion that a stay of proceedings 
was necessary in a case involving an unconstitutional strip search of an 
African Canadian charged with driving over the legal limit.22 He held 
that:  
Mr. Samuels is Afro-Canadian. It is his community that the Supreme 
Court of Canada was acutely concerned about in ensuring that a 
framework be established to prevent strip searches from occurring. … 
From the perspective of individuals like Mr. Samuels, they may well 
feel that their race has something to do with being subjected 
unnecessarily to this humiliating procedure. … such a feeling, given 
what was expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada, is not without 
some validity from a systemic viewpoint.23 
Finally, academic commentators have recognized the existence and 
validity of the Golden anti-racism principle of Charter interpretation. In 
a paper commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Charter, Professor 
Paciocco included Golden as one of the most significant Charter cases 
ever decided “given that it purports to include the impact that laws and 
practices can have on racialized communities as a constitutional 
                                                                                                             
19
 Khawaja, supra, note 16, at paras. 52-58.  
20
 Id., at para. 58. 
21
 [2008] O.J. No. 786 (Ont. C.J.).  
22
 Id., at para. 67, wherein he noted that “[a] second significant consideration in 
determining the appropriate remedy in this case is the recognition there are larger systemic issues 
involved in assessing the effects of strip searches. 
23
 Id., at para. 90. See also R. v. G. (P.F.), [2005] B.C.J. No. 1161 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) where 
para. 83 of Golden was relied on, in part, to find that a strip search of an Aboriginal woman in 
custody was unreasonable. See paras. 35, 36, 41-44. In R. v. F. (E.), [2007] O.J. No. 1000 (Ont. 
C.J.), defence counsel relied on Golden in arguing that s. 42(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, 
S.C. 2002, c. 1 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter. See paras. 117-18. Section 42(5)(a) excludes serious 
violent offences from eligibility for deferred custody and supervision. The argument was rejected by 
the trial judge. 
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consideration …”.24 In his criticism of the Supreme Court decision in R. 
v. Hall 25 and its decision to uphold the the constitutionality of the tertiary 
bail ground (section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code), Professor Stuart 
observed: 
A surprising and disappointing feature of the majority judgment in 
Hall is the failure of the majority to consider the issue of context. … In 
Golden, for example, the majority of the Court considered it important 
to develop standards for strip searches by taking into account 
Commission reports that African Canadians and Aboriginal people are 
over-represented in the criminal justice system and are therefore likely 
to be disproportionately arrested and subjected to personal searches, 
including strip searches.26 
Similarly, in his piece on the failure of the Supreme Court to address 
race in the investigative detention case of R. v. Mann,27 Professor Berger 
noted, referring to Golden, that “the Court has used equality values to 
inform their rulings concerning legal rights in other cases.”28 
IV. THE SILENCING OF THE GOLDEN PRINCIPLE  
DURING THE 2007 TERM 
The 2007 term provided the Supreme Court with a number of 
opportunities to further develop and apply the Golden principle.29 In 
                                                                                                             
24
 David Paciocco, “The Top Ten and the Tetherball”, paper presented at 25 Years of the 
Charter (Toronto: Criminal Lawyers Association Conference, 2007), at 33.  
25
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hall”]. 
26
 Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 
2005), at 415. See also Don Stuart, “The Ontario Court of Appeal Blinks and Flutters: Less 
Exclusion and Inconsistency in Stop Cases” (2007) 49 C.R. (6th) 282. 
27
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mann”]. 
28
 Benjamin Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 58, at note 25 
[hereinafter “Berger”]. See also Steve Coughlan, “Search Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed with 
Caution or Full Stop?” (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 49, at note 80. 
29
 Prior to 2007, there were a number of instances where the Court could have applied the 
Golden principle. These include Hall, supra, note 25, and Re Application Under s. 83.28 of the 
Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 which considered the investigative 
hearing provisions in s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code. Another instance was Mann, supra, note 27, 
where the Court recognized a police power in s. 9 to detain individuals for investigation on 
reasonable grounds to suspect their involvement in a recent or ongoing crime. The case involved an 
Aboriginal accused. The Court further recognized a power to frisk search detained individuals where 
there are reasonable grounds to believe they are in possession of a weapon. While the Court’s 
concern about monitoring street encounters is consistent with ensuring protection against racial 
profiling, the Court failed to address how racial profiling operates in this context, failed to address 
the implications for a narrow approach to detention in race-cases and failed to address whether 
Mann himself had been the victim of racially biased policing. See further the discussion in David M. 
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Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),30 the Court failed 
to apply a critical race lens despite evidence before it that the security 
certificate process is having a disproportionate impact on Arab and 
Muslim men.31 In their intervenors factum, the Canadian Council on 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) and the Canadian Muslim Civil 
Liberties Association (CMCLA) framed the equality issue as follows: 
Charter claims must be analyzed in the larger social, historical and 
political context in which they arise. The issues in this case must 
therefore be examined in the context of the Canadian social reality, in 
which selected minority communities have historically been targets of 
discrimination in times of public fear over real or perceived threats to 
national security. In the current context, the Muslim community is the 
target group.32 
While it is true that the Court did find that the judicial approval 
process of the security certificate was fundamentally flawed under 
section 7 because of its heightened secrecy requirements, there is no 
                                                                                                             
Tanovich, “The Colourless World of Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; Tim Quigley, “Mann, It’s a 
Disappointing Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41; and Berger, supra, note 28.  
30
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). At issue was the constitutionality of 
ss. 77-85 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”], 
entered into force June 20, 2002. The IRPA permits the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to issue a certificate declaring that a 
foreign national or permanent resident is inadmissible to Canada because that person is a security 
threat. Once the certificate is issued, the named person is detained. If a judge determines that the 
certificate is reasonable, the person is subject to a removal order. However, the detainee is not 
entitled to see any of the information in the possession of the Ministers and must rely on summaries 
provided by the judge. For a discussion of the process, see Marianne Davies, “Unequal Protection 
Under the Law: Re Charkaoui and the Security Certificate Process under the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 375; Benjamin Berger, “Our Evolving Judicature: 
Security Certificates, Detention Review and the Federal Court” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 101; and 
Colleen Bell, “Subject to Exception: Security Certificates, National Security and Canada’s ‘War on 
Terror’” (2006) 21 Can. J. Law & Society 63. 
31
 As the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) and the Canadian 
Muslim Civil Liberties Association (CMCLA) noted at para. 36 of their intervenor factum: 
Since the adoption of the IRPA in 2002, the impugned sections have been used 
specifically to target Muslims. While terrorism is known to exist globally and to be 
carried out by individuals of all religions and ethnicities, security certificates under the 
IRPA — with the sole exception of the notorious German hate-monger Ernst Zundal 
(who is not an accused terrorist) — have been applied exclusively against Muslim men 
from Arab countries. 
(On file with the author and available online at: <http://www.caircan.ca/downloads/SCC_factum.pdf>.) 
For a discussion of racial profiling in the war on terrorism, see Reem Bahdi, “No Exit: Racial 
Profiling and Canada’s War Against Terrorism” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 293; and David M. 
Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at chapter 7 
[hereinafter “The Colour of Justice”]. 
32
 CAIR-CAN and CMCLA factum, supra, note 31, at para. 10 (footnote omitted). 
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discussion or even acknowledgment of the broader social context of 
racial profiling or stereotyping and Islamaphobia.33 Nor did the Court 
adequately address the issue of differential treatment of permanent 
residents/foreign nationals and citizens.34 By failing to address these 
issues, the Court failed to engage in whether or not a security certificate 
process is even necessary in light of relevant Criminal Code provisions 
which would apply to everyone equally regardless of immigration status, 
or to ensure that Parliament would include sufficient safeguards to 
address the problem in the new regime it puts in place.35 
The Court could have also considered the Golden principle in R. v. 
Singh,36 a case which raised the issue of whether there should be an 
obligation on the police to cease questioning under section 7 when an 
accused asserts his or her right to remain silent. Singh, a South Asian 
accused, had asserted his right to remain silent 18 times. Given the 
heightened vulnerability of Aboriginal and racialized individuals in 
custody not only to violence but to waive their constitutional rights, a 
bright line rule would have gone some way in ensuring protection 
against one manifestation of systemic racism in the criminal justice 
                                                                                                             
33
 The Court limited its analysis to procedural fairness and the failure of the process to give 
detained individuals sufficient information or a substitute for that information in order to ensure an 
ability to make full answer and defence. Charkaoui, supra, note 30, at paras. 28-87. The Court also 
found that the inability of foreign nationals to have a review until 120 days had passed from the date 
of judicial confirmation of the certificate was arbitrary under ss. 9 and 10(c) of the Charter: id., at 
paras. 91-94. 
34
 The Court simply relied on the fact that s. 6 of the Charter permits differential treatment 
based on citizenship (i.e., s. 6(1) gives only citizens the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada): 
id., at para. 129. An argument justifying differential treatment based on immigration status was 
made and accepted by the House of Lords in A. (F.C.) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.). 
35
 Parliament responded to Charkaoui with Bill C-3 which received Royal Assent on 
February 22, 2008: An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and 
special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, S.C. 2008, c. 3. The Bill 
leaves the process largely unchanged with the exception of uniform detention review periods (s. 82), 
an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (s. 83(1.1)), a limited right of appeal (s. 79), and the creation of a special advocate 
process to address the case to meet concerns raised by the Supreme Court (s. 83(1.2) and 85). For 
criticisms of Bill C-3, see Maude Barlow, Roch Tassé & Sameer Zuberi, “Rushing Injustice 
Through the Senate” Toronto Star, February 13, 2008; and, Ziyaad Mia, “Bill C-3 Doesn’t Deliver 
Justice” Ottawa Citizen, February 11, 2008. 
36
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]. For criticism and 
discussion see, Don Stuart, “Annotation” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 201; Lisa Dufraimont, “Annotation” 
(2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 203; Dale Ives & Christopher Sherrin, “R. v. Singh — A Meaningless Right to 
Silence with Dangerous Consequences” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 250; and Timothy Moore and Karina 
Gagnier, “‘You can talk if you want to’: Is the Police Caution on the ‘Right to Silence’ 
Understandable?” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 233. 
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system. This vulnerability was discussed at length by the 1991 Manitoba 
Justice Inquiry report, a report cited in Golden: 
… Aboriginal people, particularly those in remote communities and 
those whose primary language is not English, appear to have special 
problems in exercising their rights to remain silent and to refrain from 
incriminating themselves. Their statements appear to be particularly 
open to being misunderstood by police interrogators and, as a result, 
may convey inaccurate information when read out in court. Their 
vulnerability arises from the legal system’s inability to break down the 
barriers to effective communication between Aboriginal people and 
legal personnel, and to differences of language, etiquette, concepts of 
time and distance, and so on. This matter has been considered in a 
number of courts, but perhaps the fullest explanation was given in an 
Australian court. This issue is so central to the role of the police in 
questioning suspects and taking statements that we quote in full the 
explanation given by Justice Forster in setting forth what are now 
called the Anunga Rules.37  
Rule 8 of the Anunga Rules specifically provides that “if an Aboriginal 
person states he does not wish to answer further questions or any 
questions the interrogation should not continue.”38 Unfortunately, 
Charron J., for a slim 5:4 majority in Singh, declined to limit the ability 
of the police to interrogate even after repeated assertions of a request to 
remain silent and dismissed the appeal. In her view, the state interest in 
the effective investigation of crime was more important than the 
certainty and additional protection against self-incrimination that a 
bright line rule would provide.39 The majority decision has effectively 
removed the right of suspects to remain silent during police 
questioning.40  
Perhaps the most disappointing omission of the Golden principle 
occurred in R. v. Clayton,41 a case concerning the creation of a police 
                                                                                                             
37
 Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, Vol. 1 (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 
1991), at chapter 16. The Manitoba Justice Inquiry recommended that the Anunga Rules be adopted 
in Canada. See also Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the Canadian Criminal Justice 
System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta (Edmonton: The Task Force, 
1991), at 2-57. For a further discussion of the Anunga Rules, see R. v. Moneyas, [1995] A.J. No. 
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Steve Coughlan, “Arbitrary Detention: Whither — or Wither? — Section 9” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) IGNORING THE GOLDEN PRINCIPLE 451 
power to erect a roadblock upon receipt of a “gun call”. I say most 
disappointing because it was a case where the Court created a new police 
power and because of the evidence that the war on guns is having a 
disproportionate impact on racialized communities in Canada.42 
V. SECTION 9 AND POLICE ROADBLOCKS IN GUN CASES:  
R. V. CLAYTON 
1. The Facts of Clayton 
At approximately 1:22 a.m., the police received a 911 call from an 
individual who reported seeing a group of 10 Black men outside a strip 
club in Brampton, four of whom publicly displayed their guns. 
According to the caller, “they had them and took them out and they put 
them back in all together.”43 The caller provided very specific 
information about the group. He was able to describe in great detail the 
vehicles they used to get to the club: 
• a black GMC Blazer; 
• a black Jeep Cherokee; 
• a tan-coloured Lexus LS; and 
• a white two-door Acura Legend.44 
He described their clothing as “regular street wear”.45 He was able to 
describe the guns. He told the dispatcher that they were not revolvers but 
fired bullets from clips like a “glock”.46  
The police responded to the call within minutes. A car that did not 
match the description was permitted to leave. After that, the police 
decided to set up, on their own initiative, a roadblock at both entrances 
to the club. Their intent was to stop every car coming from “that area 
                                                                                                             
(2d) 147 [forthcoming]; Steve Coughlan, “Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law” 
(2007), 47 C.R. (6th) 266; Don Stuart, “Annotation” (2007) 47 C.R. (6th) 222; and, Gerry Ferguson 
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at 377-79. 
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 See Tanovich, The Colour of Justice, supra, note 31, at chapters 4 and 6. 
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 Clayton, supra, note 41, at para. 2. 
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 See the trial judgment of Clayton, reported at [2001] O.J. No. 2393 at para. 6 (Ont. 
S.C.J.) and the S.C.C. judgment, supra, note 41, at para. 2. 
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 See Clayton, Court of Appeal decision, [2005] O.J. No. 1078, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 
para. 8 (Ont. C.A.). 
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because it was a gun call”.47 The second vehicle to leave the parking lot, 
approximately five minutes after the 911 call was made, was a “sporty 
black” Jaguar. It did not resemble in any way the cars that had been 
described by the tipster. Farmer was driving while Clayton was in the 
passenger seat. The car was detained by Constables Robson and 
Dickson. Although there did not appear to have been any plan in place 
about what they would do once a car was stopped, the trial judge was 
satisfied that Constable Robson’s intention was to at least search the 
vehicle while Constable Dickson’s intention was to have the occupants 
get out of the car and then to search both them and the car.48 
After stopping the car, the officers advised Clayton and Farmer 
about why they had been stopped and asked them to get out of the car. 
According to the officers, their suspicions were raised by the appellants’ 
demeanour (e.g., nervous and no eye contact), reluctance to get out of 
the car, their answer to the question whether they had seen anything (i.e., 
“we just got here”), and the fact that Clayton was wearing gloves when it 
did not seem like “glove weather”. Once outside, Clayton fled when 
Constable Robson placed his hand on his shoulder to direct him to the 
back of the car. He was tackled by other officers near the club and 
identified by one of the bouncers as one of the gunmen. Clayton 
admitted having a gun in his pants pocket and was arrested. Farmer was 
arrested and a search incident to the arrest revealed a gun lodged in his 
belt. The arrests took place six minutes after the 911 call was made.  
The central issue was whether the police had lawful authority to 
conduct a roadblock in these circumstances. The problem for the police 
and courts was that there was no recognized common law power to 
authorize the roadblock implemented by the police in this case. The only 
two available powers were the Mann and Murray powers.49 However, 
neither applied in this case.50 
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2.  The Supreme Court Decision 
Justice Abella, for a six-person majority, turned to the common law 
ancillary powers doctrine first articulated in the English case of R. v. 
Waterfield.51 In her view, if the roadblock is authorized by the ancillary 
powers doctrine and consistent with Charter values, then it is lawful and, 
therefore, not arbitrary under section 9. According to the majority, the 
“justification for a police officer’s decision to detain … will depend on 
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ underlying the officer’s suspicion that 
the detention of a particular individual is ‘reasonably necessary’”.52 The 
“totality of the circumstances” include the seriousness of the offence, the 
information known to the police about the suspect or the crime, and the 
extent to which the detention was reasonably responsive or tailored to 
these circumstances, including its geographic and temporal scope.53 The 
critical task involves 
balancing the seriousness of the risk to public or individual safety with 
the liberty interests of members of the public to determine whether, 
given the extent of the risk, the nature of the stop is no more intrusive 
of liberty interests than is reasonably necessary to address the risk.54 
Applying this analysis, the majority held that the Waterfield balance 
authorizes the police to erect a reasonably tailored roadblock when 
investigating a serious crime and where it would be an effective way to 
apprehend the perpetrators. It also authorizes the police to order the 
occupants out of the vehicle and to conduct a pat-down for officer safety 
where there are reasonable grounds to conclude that one or more of them 
are armed. On the facts of the case, Abella J. was satisfied that the 
roadblock was reasonable and effective given the nature of the risk and 
the geographic and temporal proximity to the 911 call. She further held 
that the continued detention and pat-down search of the appellants was 
lawful because the officers had reasonable grounds to suspect that they 
were in possession of guns. Those grounds included geographic and 
temporal proximity to the 911 call, the use of the rear exit, the 
                                                                                                             
51
 [1963] 3 All. E.R. 659 (C.A.). 
52
 Supra, note 41, at para. 30. 
53
 Id., at para. 31. 
54
 Id. 
454 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
occupants’ race, Farmer’s reluctance to exit the vehicle, Clayton’s 
suspicious answers to the officers’ questions and his wearing gloves.55  
3.  Commentary 
While this case was not, as Doherty J. so emphatically put it in his 
Court of Appeal decision, a racial profiling case,56 there were a number 
of aspects of the decision that would have greatly benefited from an anti-
racist analysis. Indeed, a critical race perspective may have led the Court 
to affirm the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.57 
(a)  Adding to the Officer’s Discretionary Arsenal 
Discretion is the breeding ground of racial profiling and Clayton 
adds to the discretionary arsenal of the police. While the dangers of 
racial profiling or over-policing are greatly reduced on the facts of this 
case because of the geographic and temporal proximity of the police 
response, they become more evident if we move from the parking lot of 
a strip club to a largely racialized neighbourhood or apartment complex. 
What if the next 911 caller reports seeing two Black men with guns 
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Clayton (Ont. C.A.), id., at para. 62.  
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walking down a busy street in St. Jamestown in Toronto on a Saturday 
night. Will the police be able to close off the streets and detain and 
search all Black men on the street or in a vehicle within the vicinity?58 
For how long would such a power last? What if the caller reports seeing 
four Black men enter an apartment building? Will the police be able to 
conduct a sweep of the apartment building? These examples are far more 
realistic, probable and troubling than the Skydome example given by 
Binnie J. in his concurring opinion.59 The concern about the disproportionate 
impact of the Clayton or other newly created police power on racialized 
communities particularly given the heavily publicized link between race 
and guns is a relevant consideration under the Waterfield balancing and 
the Court should have identified it as such in the case-by-case approach 
it utilized.  
(b)  The Impact of Over-policing on Racialized Communities 
Disproportionate impact does not just refer to who is subjected to a 
police detention or search. It is also relevant to assessing the nature and 
scope of the liberty interest interfered with. The evidence is overwhelming 
as to the impact that over-policing has on Aboriginal and racialized 
communities. These effects which include psychological trauma, 
alienation, and mistrust were documented in the 2003 Ontario Human 
Rights Commission report on racial profiling.60 The Court should have 
recognized this as a relevant consideration particularly as the appellants 
were Black. Had they done so, it is unlikely that Binnie J. would have 
characterized roadblock stops as of “ relatively short duration and slight 
inconvenience”.61 
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(c)  Using Race as Part of a Suspect’s Description 
Race is a very unreliable marker of identification contrary to what 
Binnie J. observed in his concurring opinion wherein he noted “… the 
911 caller must be presumed to be less error prone in dealing with a 
person’s appearance, which calls for less specialized knowledge and less 
sophisticated powers of observation.”62 Moreover, we have seen many 
incidents where race becomes the dominant characteristic of the 
investigation thereby subjecting many innocent individuals to police 
scrutiny.63 Since the Court specifically relied on race as one of the 
relevant factors in determining whether to further detain the appellants, it 
should have issued a strong warning about the dangers associated with 
race-based suspect descriptions. It could have, for example, warned that 
race should only be used where it is part of a detailed description and 
there are other safeguards present to ensure that race does not become 
the primary basis of suspect selection.64 In this case, those limiting 
features included the spatial and temporal aspects of the roadblock. 
(d)  Drawing Incriminating Inferences from Equivocal Behaviour 
One of the hallmarks of racial profiling is the turning of innocuous 
or equivocal conduct into suspicious behaviour because the officer is 
relying on a stereotypical lens in drawing his or her conclusions.65 In this 
case, the appellants’ failure to make eye contact, utterances such as “you 
gotta be kidding” or “this is ridiculous” and nervousness were equally 
consistent with either their fear of the police because of their own 
individual or community experiences and/or a history of harassment. In 
this case, however, there were other factors that minimized the 
likelihood of misinterpretation, including the objectively suspicious 
response given by Clayton (i.e., “we just got here”); the use of the rear 
exit; Clayton’s gloves; and the fact that they were stopped five minutes 
after the 911 call. Nevertheless, the Court could have warned against too 
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readily drawing negative inferences when interpreting the conduct of 
Aboriginal and racialized individuals to protect against racial profiling.  
While the last two points (i.e., (c) and (d)) would not have likely 
changed the Court’s conclusion given the unique facts of the case, the 
first two (i.e., (a) and (b)), which, in this case, were more relevant to the 
issue of roadblock jurisdiction than post-roadblock conduct, may very 
well have led the Court to pause before concluding that extending 
Waterfield on these facts was reasonably necessary.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the systemic problem of racial profiling, the Supreme Court 
will have no shortage of cases in the coming years to acknowledge and 
further develop the Golden principle of Charter interpretation.66 A proper 
application of the Golden principle in these and other Charter cases 
would require the Court to use the following framework:  
1. Does the existing power or law (or will the proposed new police 
power) have a disproportionate impact on Aboriginal or racialized 
individuals? 
(a) In Golden, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact 
that the effects of police powers are disproportionately felt by 
these communities.67 
2. If yes, are there safeguards or enhanced Charter standards that can 
be put (or already are) in place to minimize the disproportionate 
negative effects or to address the effects of over-policing?68 These 
safeguards or standards might include creating a reverse onus of 
proof,69 a presumption of racial profiling in cases where there are no 
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objectively reasonable grounds for the detention or search,70 the 
implementation of a data collection system,71 or finally, proof of 
enhanced anti-racial profiling police training.72 If there are no 
safeguards or standards in place, the power or law should be 
abolished or not recognized.73 
3. Are enhanced Charter standards necessary to ensure that racialized 
litigants will have meaningful access to Charter litigation?74  
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